CIA Conducted Secret Mosquito Experiments in India To Spread ‘Rare and Dangerous Diseases’
The CIA conducted a series of secret mosquito experiments in India to spread ‘rare and dangerous diseases’ as part of the global elite’s depopulation agenda.
According to an investigation by civil rights lawyer Nandita Haksar, the CIA carried out clandestine mosquito experiments in the 1970’s in India under the guise of eradicating yellow fever in the country.
Being the daughter of the late P.N. Haksar, a member of the Planning Commission, and Principal Secretary to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, she had firsthand knowledge of the contentious closure of the Genetic Control of Mosquitoes Unit (GCMU) under the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR).
In her own words: “It was in this room that I heard many stories of covert operations. That day, a young journalist came by and told my father of a strange experiment with mosquitoes being conducted right near Palam airport, as Delhi airport was then called. The man said it was an experiment on yellow fever. ‘But we don’t have yellow fever in India,’ my father had exclaimed. The journalist said that this was exactly his point. He claimed it was a part of a biological warfare experiment. We all sat in silence.”
The complete account of the events leading to the closure of GCMU in 1975, which was originally established by the World Health Organisation (WHO) to study genetic mosquito control, has faded into obscurity.
The financing for the GCMU project solely relied on the PL 480 Funds, which were rupees deposited with the U.S. Embassy. This funding, entirely American, was managed by the WHO. However, the collaboration between the two parties was heavily one-sided. The WHO oversaw all aspects of the project through its representative, Dr. R. Pal, while the ICMR only covered the salaries of the recruited Indian staff. There existed an agreement between the WHO and the ICMR, as well as a separate agreement between the WHO and the United States Public Health Service (USPHS). Surprisingly, the ICMR was unaware of the latter agreement, as was the Health Ministry of India. The USPHS made all the policy decisions, with a representative from Fort Detrick, the U.S. biological warfare division’s headquarters, attending the scientific and technical meetings.
According to the agreement with the ICMR, the project’s objective was to explore the potential use of genetic methods in controlling malaria and filariasis vectors. However, the actual work conducted deviated from the agreement’s intentions. No research was carried out on Anopheles stephensi, the urban malaria vector prevalent in Delhi, which was contrary to the agreement’s spirit. Extensive studies, on the other hand, focused on the filariasis vector Culex quinquifasciatus, despite the absence of filariasis in Delhi. Furthermore, there was an excessive emphasis on studying Aedes aegypti, the dangerous yellow fever vector, despite the disease not being prevalent in India. Thus, the flawed policy was apparent right from the project’s inception.
First and foremost, the decision to establish the GCMU in Delhi, a city not endemic to malaria or filariasis, raises questions. The late Dr. N.G.S. Raghavan, an authority on filariasis and the Director of the National Institute of Communicable Diseases (NICD), questioned the rationale behind choosing Delhi, as quoted by the Public Accounts Committee of Parliament. Was it due to its proximity to defense establishments? Surprisingly, the NICD was never consulted, despite being a premier Central government research institute with branches across India. Moreover, the WHO representative at the GCMU, Dr. Pal, who was in charge of all operations, had previously served as a Malaria Inspector at the Malaria Institute of India (MII) for many years before joining the WHO. It’s worth noting that he maintained his lien on his MII position even after joining the WHO, which violated the rules. The termination of his lien only occurred in 1975 when an inquiry was initiated regarding the GCMU’s work.
What the GCMU work was all about
The GCMU conducted comprehensive investigations by utilizing automated techniques to rear millions of Culex quinquifasciatus (Cq) mosquitoes and chemosterilize presumed male specimens using the drug thiotepa (and also irradiation). The unit devised a mechanical device to separate males and females at the pupal stage itself. Subsequently, the males were released in numerous villages surrounding Delhi. The intention was for the released males to compete with the indigenous males and mate with the wild females, ultimately resulting in the production of infertile eggs. However, the ecologists involved in the project discovered the following issues:
The released males exhibited inferior competitiveness in various aspects compared to the wild males, thereby failing to induce 100 percent sterility in the wild mosquito population.
The separation of sexes at the pupal stage proved to be ineffective, resulting in a female contamination rate of approximately 3-5 percent. Consequently, thousands of females, capable of biting humans, were inadvertently released alongside the males. This occurred due to the lack of distinct sexual dimorphism in the size of male and female pupae.
Alternative approaches, such as irradiation and the release of cytoplasmically incompatible Cq mosquitoes, were implemented. However, the latter method, developed by German scientist Hans Laven, turned out to be unsuccessful. It was discovered that the so-called incompatibility was attributable to the presence of a rickettsial infection, which could be cured by administering tetracycline to the animals on which the mosquitoes fed.
Nevertheless, noteworthy and extensive field studies were conducted on the ecology, behavior, and population dynamics of the filarial mosquito, Culex.
Lastly, disproportionate emphasis was placed on Aedes aegypti, accompanied by extensive research efforts.
Studies on the yellow fever vector
Why were extensive investigations conducted on Aedes aegypti, the vector of yellow fever, despite the absence of yellow fever in India? An unclassified document from the United States Army Chemical Corps in 1960, which detailed their efforts in chemical and biological warfare, revealed: “In 1953, the Biological Warfare (BW) Laboratories in Fort Detrick established a program[me] to study the use of arthropods for spreading anti-personnel BW agents.” The report cited the advantages of using insects and pointed out that “they will remain alive for some time, keeping an area constantly dangerous”.
The document highlighted the advantages of utilizing insects, noting that they could remain alive for an extended period, thereby sustaining a constant threat in a given area. The program specifically focused on studying Aedes aegypti and the yellow fever virus, with the Soviet Union being the apparent target during the Cold War era. The report mentioned, “Yellow fever has never occurred in some areas, including Asia, and therefore it is quite probable that the population of these areas would be quite susceptible to the disease.”
In the period between April and November of 1956, the Corps released non-infected female mosquitoes (Aedes aegypti) in a residential region in Savannah, Georgia. It was discovered that within a day, the mosquitoes had traveled one to two miles and had bitten numerous individuals. A subsequent test conducted in the same area in 1958 confirmed that “mosquitoes could be spread over areas of several miles by means of devices dropped from planes or set up on the ground. And while these tests were made with uninfected mosquitoes, it is a fairly safe assumption that infected mosquitoes could be spread equally well.” Consequently, it is worth noting that the GCMU had perfected “mass production techniques” and developed an automated distribution system for Aedes mosquitoes. This system was implemented through a contraption mounted on a cycle rickshaw, enabling it to navigate narrow lanes in densely populated cities and release the mosquitoes in clusters.
‘National Herald’ expose
However, the roots of controversy were planted on February 11, 1972, less than two years after the establishment of GCMU when a national daily called National Herald published an article titled “Science or Neo Imperialism” authored by an anonymous “scientific worker” (later revealed to be a deceased high-ranking defence scientist of Director’s rank). This article stirred up a commotion, shedding light on the use of thiotepa, a carcinogenic substance employed by GCMU for mosquito sterilization. The story gained further momentum when the weekly tabloid Blitz from Bombay prominently featured it in their headlines.
Interestingly, around the same time, German News, a publication by the German Embassy in Delhi